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Identity / HMR

Genesis of a
Human Root

For a human-owned lineage, accountability begins with a human root and its keys. This illustrates the OAS root ceremony; the current SDK also supports independent agent roots. This page creates no key or human enrollment; custody and owner approval are separate real integrations.

Illustrative owner-root setup
scroll to explore the setup
IdentityA portable identity. An explicit origin.
Phase 01

Entropy Collection

256 bits from CSPRNG

Real key generation uses the selected cryptographic implementation and operating-system randomness. The displayed byte stream is an illustration, not generated key material or a TPM integration.

Phase 02

Key Pair Generation

Ed25519 (Curve25519)

PUBLIC KEY
z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faizYqZq3wOverJMNRFz9c89LS
PRIVATE KEY
************************************************
illustration · real custody configured separately

The configured custody generates and protects a real Ed25519 signer. Native key libraries and hardware storage have their own guarantees; this illustration does not promise enclave custody or universal memory zeroization.

Phase 03

DID Derivation

Provider-defined exact identifier

HMR
entity kind: human root

An HMR document uses its provider's exact DID/key binding. Multibase is one key encoding, not a universal identifier rule. The Node agent workspace instead uses Base58 of a truncated BLAKE3 key digest.

Phase 04

Document Construction

JCS canonicalization

did:oas:l1fe:hmr:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faizYqZq3wOverJMNRFz9c89LS
method
oas
namespace
l1fe
kind
hmr
identifier
z6Mkha...

The DID document is assembled with verification method, authentication relationship, and optional service endpoints. Self-signed with JCS canonical serialization.

Phase 05

Key Custody

Explicit host storage policy

Hardware-backed or encrypted custody requires an actual configured provider. The public Node workspace stores a private JWK under private filesystem permissions; it is persistent, not an encrypted enclave or KMS store.

Phase 06

Public Identity Exchange

Explicit receiver onboarding

The receiver explicitly approves the exported public identity. Network registry or DHT publication requires its real adapter and policy; SDK initialization neither uploads keys nor publishes a global record.

Key Properties
Algorithm
Ed25519 (Curve25519)
Key Size
256-bit private / 256-bit public
Signature
64 bytes, deterministic
Encoding
Defined by the identity provider
Storage
Explicit private custody
Derivation
Configured OAS derivation profile